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Rule l0b-6: Options Trading by Participants in a Distribution 
Put and call options1 have been the object of considerable 
interest in the securities industry in recent years.2 Since 1973, when 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), 8 four other exchanges 
have initiated options trading,4 thereby making this investment op-
portunity available to a larger segment of the public. Investor 
response to these new markets has been overwhelming, 5 and contin-
ued growth in both the volume of transactions and the number of 
investors is anticipated. 6 As the volume of such trading increases, 
more institutions and individuals will need clarification of the appli-
cability of existing securities laws and regulations to put and call 
1. This Note deals only with stock options, and thus it is not concerned with 
commodity options. There are two types of stock options: puts and calls. A put 
is a right to sell 100 shares of the underlying stock within a specified time. A 
call is a right to buy 100 shares of the underlying stock within a specified time. 
See DIVISION OF TRADING AND Ex:CHANGES, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMN., REl'ORT 
ON PuT AND CALL OPTIONS 7-9 (1961); J. MILLER, OPTIONS TRADING 99-102 (1975); 
Anderson, Chicago Options, 21 Bus. LAw. 7, 7-9 (1971). 
2. -See, e.g., J. MILLER, supra note 1, at 8-9; Gates, The Developing Option Mar-
ket: Regulatory Issues and New Investor Interest, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 421, 452 
(1973). 
3. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9985 (Feb. 1, 1973), [1972-1973 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1[ 79,212. 
4. The Chicago Board Options Exchange began trading on April 26, 1973. Since 
that time, the same exchange model has been adopted by the American Stock Ex-
change, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11144 (Dec. 19, 1974), [1974-1975 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ,r 80,034; the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, SEC 
Exchange Act Release No. 11423 (May 15, 1975); the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, 
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 12283 (March 30, 197u); and the Midwest Stock 
Exchange, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13045 (Dec. 8, 1976). The New York 
Stock Exchange may begin options trading soon. See [1976] SEC, REo. & L. REP. 
(BNA) No. 372, at A-8; [1977] SEC. REG. & L. REP, (BNA) No. 407, at A-10; 
Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1976, at 22, col. 3. The most recent development in ex-
change-traded options is the SEC's approval of put option trading on all five of 
the above exchanges currently trading calls. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13401 
(March 23, 1977), [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 81,030, 
For a discussion of the competition among these exchanges, see Wall St. J., May 
27, 1CJ77, at 1, col. 6. 
5. In March 1974, the CBOE monthly trading volume was equivalent to 33.6 
million underlying shares. J. MILLER, supra note 1, at 8-9. · Between November 1, 
1975 and November 30, 1976, the average monthly volume on the CBOE was equiva-
lent to nearly 170 million underlying shares. The average combined monthly volume 
for the CBOE, American, Philadelphia, and Pacific Coast exchanges between April 
1, 1976 and November 30, 1976 was approximately 253 million underlying shares. 
36 U.S. SECURITIES AND Ex:CHANGE COMMN., STATISTICAL BULLETIN No. 1, at 26 
(fan. 1977). 
6. Since the New York Stock Exchange may soon be trading options, see note 
4 supra, the dramatic increase in trading volume, see note 5 supra, might well be 
expected to continue. 
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transactions. For example, the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 
and certain regulations promulgated thereunder! control whether 
participants9 in a distribution10 may trade the securities being offered 
for sale. It is perhaps inevitable that participants in a distribution 
will discover that they are holding or trading options respecting se-
curities that they are distributing.11 The question that will arise in 
this situation is whether--or to what extent-the parties involved 
should be allowed to trade such options.12 
After briefly discussing the history of options trading, this Note 
argues that where participants in a distribution trade options, the 
potential for abuse is sufficient to warrant regulation of this activity. 
It then evaluates existing statutes and SEC rules that seek to prevent 
similar abuses and concludes that language in some of these provi-
sions-particularly rule lOb-613-can be construed to prohibit partici-
pants in a distribution from engaging in certain put and call trans-
actions that might manipulate the price of the security being dis-
tributed.14 
I. THE NATURE OF OPTIONS TRADING 
A. Background 
Although extensive options trading occurred as early as the 
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
8. E.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.lOb-2, .lOb-6, .lOb-7, .lOb-8 (1977). 
9. For the purposes of this Note, the terms "participants" and "interested parties" 
refer to "issuers," "underwriters," and "prospective underwriters" as used in SEC rule 
lOb-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-6 (1977). See note 91 infra. For discussions of the 
persons to whom rule lOb-6 applies, see 3 L. Loss, SEcURmES REGULATION 1596-
99 (2d ed. 1961); E. WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEAL-
ERS 132 (1965); and Comment, The S.E.C.'s Rule IOb-6: Preserving a Competitive 
Market During Distributions, 1967 DUKE L.J. 809, 840-46. See also SEC Exchange 
Act Release No. 7743 (Nov. 12, 1965), [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) ,r 77,306 (dealer qualified as an underwriter even though the dealer's 
New York office had refused to underwrite the issue and no underwriting fee had 
been paid). 
10. For a discussion of the term "distribution" as used in this Note, see note 
91 infra. 
11. Investment banks, corporations, and brokerage 'firms frequently trade securi-
ties for their own accounts. -&ee Foshay, Market Activities of Participants in Securi-
ties Distributions, 45 VA. L. REv. 907, 907-08 (1959). 
12. The SEC staff is currently studying the rapidly expanding options markets, 
and Mr. Andrew Klein, head of the Office of Market Structure and Trading Prac-
tices, has questioned whether a participant in a distribution can solicit prospective 
buyers of the stock to write options on the stock. Apparently the SEC's concern 
is that creating additional interest in the stock will drive up the price. As of yet, 
however, the SEC has taken no position on this question. See [1976] SEC. REG. & 
L. REP. (BNA) No. 348, at A-9. 
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-6 (1977), quoted in note 97 infra. 
14. In general, the questions underlying the analysis of all problems arising under 
the securities laws are ( 1) whether these laws were intended to forbid the conduct 
in question, and (2) whether the broad purposes of these laws would be furthered 
by applying their sanctions to the situation under review. See SEC v. National Sec., 
Inc., 393 U.S. 453,467 (1969). 
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seventeenth century, 15 options were not widely traded in this country 
until shortly after the Civil War.16 Soon thereafter the use of options 
by unscrupulous financiers engendered adverse public opinion, and 
some courts, seeking to eliminate such trading altogether, deemed 
options to be violative of ·state gambling laws.17 Other courts, how-
ever, upheld options as valid contracts, apparently because they were 
persuaded that the value of options to business people who desired to 
mitigate the uncertainty of fluctuating prices for their supplies and 
products outweighed the risks of manipulation and fraud occasioned 
by their use.18 Options trading persisted despite its disapproval in 
some states; in fact, during the economic boom of the 1920s, options 
15. Probably the earliest large-scale use of options occurred during the famous 
"tulip bulb craze" in seventeenth century Holland. During this period, buyers of 
tulip bulbs purchased options (calls) in order to assure themselves of sufficient sup• 
plies of the commodity; sellers of the bulbs purchased options (puts) in order to 
assure themselves of a market in which to sell future supplies. Speculators with 
no interest in acquiring or selling the bulbs underlying these options realized that 
it was possible to profit on the price fluctuations of the options without ever taking 
delivery of the underlying bulbs, and they therefore created a market for the options 
alone. As will be discussed, see text at note 38 infra, this phenomenon of profit-
making by trading options serves as the foundation for modem options exchanges 
such as the CBOE. See generally H. FILER, UNDERSTANDING PUT AND CALL OPTIONS 
12 (1959); J. MILLER, supra note 1, at 1-10; E. MORGAN & w. THOMAS, THB STOCK 
EXCHANGE: ITS HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS 21 (1962); Note, Exchange-Traded Stock 
Options: Investment Techniques and Tax Strategy, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 753, 753-54 
(1975). 
16. See, e.g., J. MILLER, supra note 1, at 3; Note, supra note 15, at 753 & n.S. 
11. See, e.g., Corcoran v. Lehigh & Franklin Coal Co., 138 III. 390, 28 N.E. 
759 (1891); Schneider v. Turner, 130 III. 28, 22 N.E. 497 (1889); Lock v. Towler, 
41 Ill. App. 66 (1891); Osgood v. Bauder, 75 Iowa 550, 39 N.W. 887 (1888); Ru-
dolf v. Winters, 7 Neb. 125 (1878). Remnants of this attitude have survived into 
the modem era. See [1971] OP. GA. ATTY. GEN. 71-115 (Georgia Attorney General 
opined that certain put and call options were not gambling devices under the Georgia 
gambling laws). 
Public antipathy toward options is also evident in trust law. In the absence of 
express statutory authority, the power to grant options has usually not been granted 
to trustees even though the trustee is empowered to sell trust property. The rationale 
for this principle has been that at the time of the sale the trustee should be in 
a position to exercise discretion as to the amount of the purchase price. 3 A. Scol'I', 
THB LAw OF TRUSTS § 190.8, at 1573 (3d ed. 1967); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, 
TuuSTS AND TRUSTEES § 741, at 567 (2d ed. 1960). In fact, courts have implied a 
power of a trustee to grant options only when necessary to carry out the purpose of 
the trust. See Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 313 Mo. 552, 281 S.W. 744 
(1926). 
As is the case with investors, adverse attitudes toward trustees dealing in options 
have ei;:oded. Today state statutes generally give trustees the power to grant options. 
E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 148, § 104.01 (1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 30.99.070 
(2) (1961). 
18. These courts generally upheld the options only if the parties had a bona 
fide intention to deliver or purchase the underlying commodity. Compare Embrey 
v. Jemison, 131 U.S. 336 (1889) (option invalid under New York and Virginia law 
because no bona fide intent to deliver), with Story v. Salomon, 71 N.Y. 420 (1877) 
(option valid upon presumption of bona fide intent). See also 6A A. CoRBIN, CON• 
TRACTS 673-76 (1962); Annot., 1 A.L.R. 1548 (1919). 
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became favored devices for fraudulent manipulations.19 These 
abuses did not go unnoticed. The Senate Committee on Banking 
and Currency, in its favorable report on the bill that later became 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,20 stated that "[m]any of the 
most flagrant abuses upon stock exchanges would not be possible 
without the aid of options. -They are indispensable concomitants of 
every pool operation designed to distribute stock at an increased 
price. "21 The fear of manipulations through options trading was so 
great that an early draft of the Exchange Act proposea: a prohibition 
of all options trading. 22 Althpugh the final version of the Act did 
not prohibit options trading, it did contain a general prohibition 
against the use of manipulative devices.23 Even more significant was 
the Act's specific grant of authority to the SEC to promulgate rules 
regulating the trading of put and call options. 24 Despite the concern 
over options, no rules were adopted pursuant to this authority, 25 and 
the options industry continued unchanged for nearly forty years.26 
All trading took place in over-the-counter (OTC) markets27 and was 
relatively complicated because the options contained three variables-
19. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934), as quoted in note 
21 infra and accompanying text. For examples of fraudulent manipulations, see 
Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, 46 YALE L.J. 624, 
626-28 (1937), discussed in 3 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 1529-40. 
20. S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(a) (9) (1934). 
21. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). The committee report con-
tinues: 
Enormous profits have been made by operators who traded against options with-
out incurring the slightest risk or obligation. The New York Stock Exchange 
a few months ago, at the suggestion of this committee's counsel, adopted a rule 
requiring its members to report regularly on options in which they are inter-
ested or of which they have knowledge by reason of transactions executed by 
or through them; but evasion of the rule is easily accomplished by causing the 
options to be granted to persons who are not members of the exchange or bound 
by its rules. Here again the necessity for regulation by a commission having 
authority over nonmembers as well as members of an exchange is evident. 
Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934); SENATE CoMM. 
ON BANKING AND ClJRRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 45-47 (1934); 3 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 1529-30. 
22. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 1544 & n.45. 
23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970); 
see text at notes 60-71 infra. 
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1970); see 
text at notes 55-56 infra. 
25. Indeed, there are currently no rules in effect pursuant to this grant of author-
ity. See text at notes 55-56 infra. 
26. The OTC options market, in which all options trading took place during these 
years, is still in use, but its importance has diminished since the creation of the CBOE 
and its counterparts. See text at notes 35-39 infra. 
27. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 468. Nearly every transaction in the OTC 
market involves the Put and Call Brokers and Dealers Association, which serves 
as a clearinghouse for the options departments of large brokerage firms. See id.; 
J. M)Ll.Ell, supra note 1, at 14. 
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the premium, 28 the striking price, 29 and the expiration date-all of 
which were subject to negotiation between the optionor and the 
optionee. 30 The ability to choose the terms of the option enabled 
investors to devise a virtually unlimited variety of option instruments 
for each issue of stock. The market became cumbersome, but, so 
long as the optionee held his option with the intention ultimately to 
exercise it for purposes of increasing or reducing his holdings, the 
system worked in a reasonably satisfactory manner: each party to 
the instrument was fij}ly aware of the terms that had been negotiated 
and each recognized certain rights and obligations pursuant to the 
option. Thus, when an optionee chose to exercise an option, he was 
exercising a right the terms of which were tailored to his specific 
investment needs. 
For optionees who desired to recognize immediate profits, how-
ever, the OTC market possessed serious drawbacks. In particular, 
the absence of a readily available "secondary market" in which the 
options themselves could be resold disadvantaged many investors. If 
an option holder sought to gain a profit by selling the option itself, 
he would encounter extreme difficulty in finding a buyer whose 
needs would be satisfied by the option's unique terms. The unavail-
ability of a meaningful secondary market forced brokers to charge 
high commissions for matching buyers and sellers.31 The alternative 
means of recognizing a profit was to exercise the option and simul-
taneously enter the market to cover the exercise by selling or acquir-
ing the underlying stock. 32 In order to do this, however, the 
optionee had to pay two commissions-one to exercise the option 
and another to make the transaction involving the underlying stock. 33 
These disadvantages of the OTC market probably discouraged 
28. The premium is the "price" charged for the option. See DIVISION OF 'Iiw>-
INO AND EXCHANGES, SECURITIES & ExCHANGB CoMMN., supra note 1, at 9; J. MILLER, 
supra note 1, at 101; Anderson, supra note 1, at 7. 
29, The striking price, or contract price, is the price at which the option may 
be exercised. See DMSION OF TRADING AND ExCHANGES, SECURITIES & ExcHANOI! 
CoMMN., supra note 1, at 9; J. MILLER, supra note 1, at 102; Anderson, supra note 
1, at 7. 
30. The optionor is the party who writes or issues the option; the optionee is 
the party who acquires and has the right to exercise it. 
31. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 9; Gates, supra note 2, at 432; Note, supra 
note 15, at 755. 
32. Whether the optionee would enter the market to sell the underlying stock 
or to buy it would depend, of course, on whether he held a put or a call. The 
holder of a call would exercise his option and simultaneously sell the underlying 
stock when the market price was above his striking price. The holder of a put 
would exercise his option and simultaneously acquire the underlying stock when the 
market price was below his striking price. In either case, the optionee would realize 
a profit equal to the spread between the market price and striking price, less the 
premium and commissions paid, 
33. Gates, supra note 2, at 432, 
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options trading, especially among small investors who were reluctant 
to contend with the cumbersome and expensive system. 34 
Because of the disadvantages of the OTC system, in 1973 the 
SEC approved the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). as a 
"national securities exchange."35 Other exchanges have subse-
quently sought and received approval for options trading.36 These 
exchanges have benefited options trading in several ways, such as 
by providing a central marketplace for buyers and sellers and by fix-
ing expiration dates and striking prices.37 Perhaps the most signifi-
cant benefit of the CBOE and its counterparts on the American, 
Philadelphia, Midwest, and Pacific Coast exchanges is that these 
markets, unlike the OTC system, provide a very accessible "secondary 
market." Whereas the OTC system requires option holders to pay 
high commissions to sell their options, the exchanges enable holders 
to sell their options at reasonable transaction costs. In fact, most of 
the profits and losses on such exchanges are realized on the move-
ment of the prices of options themselves rather than on conversion of 
the options into their underlying stocks. 38 By this streamlining of 
the secondary market, the new exchanges have made options trading 
feasible for greater numbers of investors. 39 
B. Purposes and Uses 
Stock option trading serves several legitimate purposes.4° For 
example, an investor might trade puts and calls in order to compen-
34. The drafters of the early version of the Exchange Act, see text at note 22 
supra, and the judges of the late nineteenth century Illinois, Iowa and Nebraska 
courts, see text at note 17 supra, believed that there was something inherently evil 
about options trading by parties who have no intention of acquiring or selling the 
underlying securities. It is arguable under this view that the system for trading op-
tions should be made so cumbersome as to deter pure speculators from entering the 
market. However, the reaction of Congress to the proposed prohibition against op-
tion trading, see text at notes 22-23 supra, and the SEC's approval of the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange, see text at note 35 infra, demonstrates that contemporary 
attitudes view options trading not as being inherently evil but as offering an invest-
ment opportunity that should be available to all investors, including those who have 
. neither the time nor the resources to trade in the over-the-counter market. 
35. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9985 (Feb. 1, 1973); see Fraidin, Develop-
ments in Federal.Securities Regulation, 30 Bus. LAw. 313, 320-23 (1975). 
36. See note 4 supra. 
37. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 9; Gates, supra note 2, at 450-52. 
38. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 10. For a discussion of this phenomenon 
during the seventeenth century tulip bulb craze, see note 15 supra. 
39. See Gates, supra note 2, at 452-55; note 5 supra. 
40. The SEC has listed four reasons for buying options: (1) to protect a position 
against fluctuating market prices, (2) to engage in in-and-out trading with a limited 
potential loss, (3) tax savings, and ( 4) speculation on a small amount of capital. 
DMSION OF TRADING AND ExCHANGES, SECURITIES & ExCHANGB CoMMN., supra note 
1, at 76-77. Of these four, the last appears to lure the most investors into the options 
market. "The brokers iinterviewed were unanimous in the opinion that the rea-
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sate for or "hedge" a long41 or short42 position in a particular secu-
rity. 43 Such an investor does not guarantee himself the most profit-
able transaction possible, but he does ensure his ability to participate 
in the market in the future at a certain price44 and sets an upper 
limit on his losses. 45 
Although no reason exists to prevent investors from trading puts 
and calls as a hedge or for other legitimate ends, different consider-
ations are pertinent when an individual is involved in the distribution 
of securities that underlie the options he wishes to buy, sell, or exer-
son most persons bought options was the opportunity it afforded them for speculation 
on a small amount of capital." Id. 
The economic incentive inherent in the second and fourth factors listed by the 
SEC is that losses are limited to the premiums paid for options while possible gains 
are theoretically unlimited. For instance, suppose a person buys a put on XYZ stock, 
with a striking price equal to a current market price of $15 per share, for a premium 
of $100. If the investor has wrongly assessed the market price fluctuations of XYZ 
and the price goes up to $20 per share during the life of the put, he loses only 
the $100 premium. However, if the market price of XYZ declines, the investor 
profits when the market price drops below $14 per share. The optionee in effect 
places a wager on the price movement of the underlying stock, risking a relatively 
small amount of capital on a bet with no upper limit on the potential profit. 
41. In the securities industry, an investor is "long" with respect to a particular 
security when he has an abundant number of shares, or a number of shares in excess 
of the shares he has become obligated to deliver to another investor in the future. 
See G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING & FINANCE 546 (7th ed. F. Garcia 1973). 
42. An investor is "short" with respect to a security when he holds fewer shares 
of the security than he needs to fulfill his obligations to sell. See, e.g., Boyle v. 
Henning, 121 F. 376, 380 (W.D. Ky. 1902); Thomas v. McShan, 99 Okla. 88, 225 
P. 713, 714 (1924). 
43. As used in this Note, a "hedge" is a transaction entered into for the purpose 
of protecting against loss by assuring the existence of a buyer (in the case of a 
"long" position) or a supplier (in the case of "short" position). For example, an 
investor who is "long" in a particular stock can hedge his position by acquiring puts. 
By doing so, the investor assures himself of a future market in which he will be 
able to sell his excess supply at a fixed price. While the price may not be as high 
as he would prefer, he is willing to sacrifice maximum profit for the certainty of 
the future market. Similarly, an investor who is "short" in a particular security 
can hedge his position by acquiring calls. The investor thereby assures himself that, 
despite a sudden rise in the market price of the security, he will be able to fulfill 
his obligations by acquiring the stock at the call's striking price. Again, the transac-
tions may not be the most profitable, but the investor sacrifices some profit for cer-
tainty. 
An investor in a long position would not be as likely to write calls as he would 
be to acquire puts; writing calls would leave him without control over whether he 
would sell pursuant to the option or on the open market. Moreover, he would be 
severely disadvantaged if the market price of the stock rose. In that event, his op-
tionees would exercise their calls, and he would be forced to sell at a price below 
market. Similarly, an investor in a short position is not likely to write puts since 
the optionees would exercise their puts only if the market price dropped. The op-
tionor would then have to purchase at a price above the market. In either case, 
the hedging party would prefer to be the optionee. 
44. See note 43 supra. 
45. See note 40 supra. 
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cise. Because the options exchanges place daily options transactions 
in public view, parties interested in a distribution are provided with 
the opportunity to create the appearance of widespread interest in 
the security being distributed by actively trading options on that se-
curity. Thus, the participants in the distribution might trade puts 
and calls to facilitate sales of the underlying security and thereby 
manipulate the market for it if, for example, the underwriters have 
difficulty selling the issue. Moreover, such trading is likely to cause 
the price of the option to rise, thereby attracting investor interest and 
indirectly increasing the demand for the underlying security.46 In 
effect, an upward "massaging" of the option price tends to have a 
similar effect upon the price of the underlying security.47 
More significantly, a participant in a distribution might trade puts 
and calls in order to affect more directly the market for the under-
lying security. For example, to facilitate a troublesome distribution, 
a participant might acquire calls in order to create buying pressure 
on the security.48 As a purchaser of calls, the participant can antic-
ipate that the writer of the calls will enter the market and purchase 
the underlying security in quantities sufficient to ensure that he will 
be able to meet his obligations when the calls are exercised. 49 If 
46. The SEC has expressed concern over this effect in situations where partici-
pants have solicited prospective buyers to write options on the stock. See note 12 
supra. 
47. See Lowenfels, Rule lOb-13, Rule lOb-6 and Purchases of Target Company 
Securities During an Exchange Offer, 69 CoLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1398, 1407 (1969) 
(citing Miller v. Steinbach, 286 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ). 
48. Upon initial consideration, acquiring calls appears to be the opposite of what 
an underwriter would do in order to sell the underlying security. By acquiring calls 
the underwriter, in effect, would be using options in approximately the same manner 
as if he were attempting to cover a short position. See note 43 supra. However, 
an underwriter who is having trouble with a "sticky issue" is essentially "long" in 
the security, and presumably would purchase puts instead of calls in order to create 
a certain market for the stock. See note 43 supra. 
Closer analysis, however, reveals why purchasing calls facilitates distribution of 
the underlying security. Acquiring a put gives the holder the right to sell a security 
during an agreed-upon period of time. Holding a right to sell does nothing to in-
crease demand for the security, which is what is needed to facilitate the distribution. 
Acquiring a call, however, induces the writer of the call to enter the market and 
purchase the underlying security in quantities sufficient to be able to fulfill his obli-
gation when the call is exercised. Thus, by purchasing large ·quantities of calls, 
a participant can generate buying pressure on the underlying security. 
With the advent of options exchanges, the writers of the calls are the exchanges 
themselves. There is no reason, however, why the CBOE and other options ex-
changes should be less inclined than any other optionor to enter the market and 
purchase securities in quantities sufficient to fulfill their obligations under outstand-
ing calls. For a discussion of the CBOE as a clearinghouse for all options traded 
through its mechanisms, see Note, supra note 15. 
49. Of course, if the options are "covered" rather than "naked," in the sense 
that the optionor already owns sufficient shares of the security to satisfy potential 
obligations created by the calls, the optionor would not enter the market in order 
to make additional purchases. However, to the extent that the optionor will be with-
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the participant in the distribution acquires a large number of calls, 
the increased buying pressure on the underlying security will cause 
the price of the security to increase.150 As the price of the security 
rises, investors may well be induced to purchase it from the under-
writer. ·Because investors might be deceived into paying inflated 
prices for securities as a result of options trading by the parties inter-
ested in a distribution, it would seem quite appropriate to regulate 
such trading. The remainder of this Note, therefore, considers 
whether there are any statutes or SEC rules that can be used to regu-
late this manipulative activity. 
Il. REGULATION OF OPTIONS TRADING 
The main purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934151 was 
to provide investors with securities markets in which prices would 
be established by the uninhibited interaction of supply and de-
mand.152 Manipulative options trading was one of the evils that had 
been frustrating the free movement of prices.153 As discussed above, 114 
an early draft of the Exchange Act would have prohibited all 
trading of puts and calls. Although this prohibition was not en-
acted, in section 9 (b) of the Act Congress did grant the SEC the 
authority to promulgate rules regulating transactions involving such 
instruments. M While the legislative history of the Exchange Act and 
holding his shares from the market, the effect is similar to that of making additional 
purchases because in both situations the supply of the securities is restricted. 
50. Lowenfels, supra note 47, at 1407. 
51. 15U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970&Supp. V 1975). 
52. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970 
& Supp. V 1975). President Roosevelt, in his message to Congress urging legislation 
to regulate securities markets, referred to "pool[s] of individuals or corporations with 
large resources . . . which sought by manipulation to raise or depress market quota-
tions." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). The Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency, in its report on the Exchange Act, noted that "[s]everal 
devices are employed for the purpose of artificially raising or depressing security 
prices. Those which appear to serve no legitimate function are specifically pro-
hibited." S. REP. No. 7'.12, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934). For a discussion of 
manipulation of securities markets in England and the United States prior to 1934, 
see 3 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 1531-40. 
53. See text at notes 19-23 supra. 
54. See text at notes 20-22 supra. 
55. Section 9(b)(l) of the Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b)(1) (1970), pro-
vides that 
It shall be unlawful for any person to effect, by use of any facilitr of a na-
tional securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest 
or for the protection of investors-(1) any transaction in connection with any 
security whereby any party to such transaction acquires any put, call, straddle 
or other option or privilege of buying the security from or selling the security 
to another without being bound to do so. 
The terms "put," "call," "straddle," "option" and "privilege" are d(lfined in § 9(d) 
of the Act as not including "any registered warrant, right, or convertible security," 
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the language ·of section 9(b) clearly demonstrate that the drafters 
contemplated the kinds of options being traded in modem options 
markets, section 9(b) is not an effective device for controlling poten-
tial abuses involving puts and calls: the provision is not self-execut-
ing, and currently no rules are in effect pursuant to the section. 56 
Notwithstanding the ineffectiveness of section 9(b), there are two 
other provisions-section 9(a)(2)57 and section 10(b)58-that ap-
pear to be sufficiently broad to regulate manipulative activity involv-
ing puts and calls. 59 
Section 9(a)(2), which is commonly referred to as the Exchange 
Act's "general anti-manipulation provision,"60 makes it unlawful 
to effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of 
transactions in any security registered on a national securities ex-
change creating actual or apparent active trading in such security 
or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the purpose 
of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others. 61 
Since section 9(a)(2) contains broad, self-executing language, it 
could be read as reaching all manipulative transactions, including 
those in which participants in a distribution employ options to 
manipulate the price of the security being distributed. 62 However, 
15 U.S.C. § 78i(d) (1970). This limiting definition is significant to the interpreta-
tion of the term "right" as used in rule lOb-6. See text at notes 99-113 infra. 
56. Rule 9b-1, concerning transactions in certain options, was rescinded by SEC 
Exchange Act Release No. 11604, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) 11 80,267 (Aug. 19, 1975). In 1973, the SEC proposed rule 9b-2-"Dis-
closure Suitability of Recommendations, Reporting, and Net Capital Requirements 
of Broker-Dealers in Option Transactions." See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 
9994, (Feb. 8, 1973) [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1179,221; 
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10550 (Dec. 13, 1973), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 11 79,601. This proposed rule has no effect on the issues 
discussed in this Note. 
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970). 
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (19-70). 
59. See In re White (White, Weld & Co.), 3 S.E.C. 466, 535-37 (1938) (SEC 
recognized that, despite the absence of rules under section 9 (b), transactions involv-
ing options may violate section 9(a) ). 
60. Weiss & Leibowitz, Rule l0b-6 Revisited, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 475 
(1971) (quoting Hearings on SEC Legislation Before a Subcomm. of the Senate 
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 367 (1959) ). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970). Section 9(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(6) 
(1970), complements section 9(a) (2) by granting the SEC the authority to prescribe 
rules and regulations as it may deem appropriate to regulate ''transactions for the 
purchase and/or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange 
[effected] for the purpose of pegging, fixing, or stabilizing the price of such security." 
62. As used in this Note, "manipulation" means activity that affects the price 
of a security to a greater degree than is permissible as a "stabilizing" measure. Sta-
bilization, defined as "the buying of a security for the limited purpose of preventing 
or retarding a decline in its open market price in order to facilitate its distribution 
to the public," SEC Exchange Act Release No. 2446, at 3 (March 18, 1940), has 
long been considered a form of manipulation. See id. at 2. Nevertheless, stabiliza-
tion was recognized at the time the securities laws were drafted as a legitimate device 
because it permits underwriters participating in distributions to sell securities quickly. 
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the conclusion that section 9(a)(2) applies to participants' options 
transactions during a distribution is not beyond dispute . 
. Section 9(a)(2) prohibits manipulative "transactions in any 
security . . : fur the purpose of inducing the purchase . . . of such 
security."63 An option is commonly considered a security,04 so this 
language might be interpreted to mean that, since options trading 
by participants would be intended to induce purchases or sales of 
the underlying security rather than of such options, section 9(a)(2) 
is inapplicable to this kind of options trading. However, such a 
narrow reading· of the statute seems unwarranted. Congress ex-
pressly provided that the definitions of the key terms of the Ex-
change Act, such as "security," are to be applied flexibly to promote 
the purposes of the Act and should not be employed if "the context 
otherwise requires."65 Moreover, it is noteworthy that the SEC has 
promulgated rule 3all-l66 to clarify the section 3(a)(l1)67 defini-
tion of "equity security," a term used in section 16, 68 the provision 
controlling insider transactions. Rule 3all-1 states that the term 
"equity security" includes "any stock or similar security, ... or any 
put, call, straddle, or other option or privilege of buying . . . or 
selling such a security."69 The statutory definition of "equity 
security" in section 3(a)(l 1) is very similar to that of "security" in 
section 3(a)(10), 70 which is the relevant definition for section 
9(a)(2). If the interpretation of "equity security" in rule 3all-1 
may be applied to the term "security," then section 9(a)(2) can be 
construed as prohibiting- put and call transactions that manipulate the 
Congress felt that the advantages of "stabilization" outweighed its potential abuses 
and therefore did not prohibit this activity; rather, Congress left it to be regulated 
by the SEC. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934); S. REP. 
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1934). The grant of regulatory authority is in 
§ 9(a)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(6) (1970). 
The SEC has exercised this authority. See Rule lOb-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.tob-7 
(1977). For discussions of stabilization, see, e.g., 3 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 1571• 
94; Foshay, supra note 11, at 913-15; Weiss & Liebowitz, supra note 60, at 478; 
Wolfson, Rule I0b-6: The Illusory Search for Certainty, 25 STAN .. L. REV. 809, 813 
(1973). 
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970) (emphasis added). 
64. Section 3(a) (10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) 
(10) (1970), defines a "security" as "any instrument commonly known as a secu-
rity." The SEC has recognized options as securities in their own right. SEC Ex-
change Act Release No. 10397, (Sept 21, 1973) [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. 
L. REP. (CCH) ,r 79,517; see 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 467-69; Long, The Naked 
Commodity Option Contract as a Security, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 211 n.1 
(1973 ). 
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1970). 
66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1977). 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1970). 
68. 15 u.s.c. § 78p (1970). 
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1977). 
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1970). 
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prices of their underlying securities, since any transaction involving 
the options would be deemed to be a transaction involving the under-
lying security. Indeed, it seems reasonable to conclude that sec-
tion 9(a)(2), in order to fulfill its general purpose of prohibiting 
manipulation, requires such an interpretation of the term "secu-
rity."n 
Although section 9(a)(2) appears to apply to the trading of 
options by participants in a distribution, use· of this provision to 
regulate such transactions is not without difficulty. One potential 
barrier to applying the section is its "intent" requirement-in order 
for there to be a violation, the transaction must have been under-
taken "for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale" of the se-
curity in question. 72 While the SEC rarely initiates cases under sec-
tion 9 because of the burden of proving the existence of "purpose, "73 
the Commission74 and the courts711 have been willing to infer the 
requisite purpose from the circumstances of the transaction. For ex-
ample, one factor that permits finding such a purpose is whether an 
individual has a "substantial, direct pecuniary interest in the success 
of a proposed offering."76 Certainly a participant in a distribution 
possesses such an interest and hence has an incentive to manipulate 
the security's price. 77 Therefore, in most cases, the "purpose" re-
quirement of section 9(a)(2) should pose no barrier to the regula-
tion of options trading by participants in a distribution. Yet, as is 
suggested by the -paucity of SEC litigation, this barrier may not al-
ways be surmountable. Thus, the use of other provisions-such as 
rule I Ob-6, which is discussed below78-would be preferred if they 
can control this type of manipulation without requiring a showing of 
purpose. 
Moreover, it is significant that section 9(a)(2) deals only with 
71. While the "general antimanipulation" purpose of section 9(a) (2) calls for 
this interpretation of the term "security," the purposes of rule lOb-6 do not. See 
text at notes 118-26 infra. 
72. See text at note 61 supra. 
73. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 665 (4th ed. 1977). 
14. See In re Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106, 123-24 (1949). 
15. See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). But cf. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 
341 (2d Cir. 1973), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 
Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977) (refusal to infer a manipulative purpose from circumstan-
tial evidence when there was strong evidence of legitimate business reasons for de-
fendants' conduct). Accord, Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 
1950), affd., 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953). 
76. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 795 (2d Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). 
11. See SEC v. Resch-Cassin &Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
78. See text at notes 90-146 infra. 
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securities registered on a national securities exchange. 70 Although 
this does not render section 9(a)(2) useless in controlling manipu-
lations involving options, it significantly limits the section's scope, 
since it does not reach manipulations involving OTC options. 
Finally, section 9(a)(2) requires a "series" of manipulative trans-
actions80 and thus does not extend to isolated manipulative trades. 
Clearly it would be advantageous to regulate options trading by par-
ticipants in a distribution by using a rule that does not require a series 
of transactions and is not limited to securities traded on national 
securities exchanges. 
Fortunately, section 9(a)(2) is complemented by a broader pro-
vision, section lO(b),81 which makes it unlawful "[t]o use or employ, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on 
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe."82 Un-
like section 9(b),88 the provision of the Act permitting regulation 
of puts and calls, section lO(b) has been given effect through sev-
eral specific rules. Rule l0b-5,84 the broadest of these rules, makes 
it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
. . . or . . . to engage in any practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." It is thus clear 
that manipulative options trading by parties interested in the dis-
tribution of a security falls within the scope of rule l0b-5 to the ex-
tent that it operates as a fraud or deceit upon investors. Options 
trading is undoubtedly an "act, practice or course of business," and 
if such trading is undertaken to facilitate the distribution of a secu-
rity, it is clearly "in connection with" the purchase or sale of the secu-
rity. Moreover, the Supreme C~urt has stated that an expansive view 
of section lO(b) should be taken when determining what types of 
fraud are within its scope.85 Yet, in other respects, the Court has 
19. See text at note 61 supra. 
80. See text at note 61 supra. 
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). In SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 
964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court stated that "[i]t is well settled that the manipu-
lative activities expressly prohibited by § 9(a) (2) of the Exchange Act with respect 
to a listed security are also violations of • . • § lO(b) of the Exchange Act when 
the same activities are conducted with respect to an over-the-counter security." 
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). 
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1970). For a discussion of section 9(b), see text at 
notes 54-59 supra. · 
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1977). 
85. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). 
Other courts have supported the proposition that manipulative transactions are within 
the scope of rule l0b-5. See, e.g., United States v. Charney, 537 F.2d 341 (9th 
Cir. 1976); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 1974); 
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restricted the effect of the rule. For example, it has held that a pri-
vate cause of action for damages will not lie if ·the plaintiff fails to 
allege an intent to defraud, or "scienter."86 Thus, in certain circum-
stances, 87 investors defrauded by manipulative options trading might 
be forced to make the same showing of intent under rule lOb-5 that 
they would have to make under section 9(a)(2). 88 Although meet-
ing this burden probably would not be insurmountable in most cases, 
this consideration-when viewed in light of an apparent trend in Su-
preme Court cases to limit the effect of rule l0b-589-suggests the 
desirability of finding some other rule to provide a remedy for inves-
tors defrauded by manipulative options trading during a distribution. 
The remainder of this Note contends that rule lOb-690 is well suited 
to protect such investors. 
Rule 1 0b-6 specifically addresses the problem of manipulations 
by persons participating in a distribution.91 Adopted in response to 
Crane__Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 795 (2d· Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). While none of these cases involved options trading 
as the means of manipulation, there is no reason why rule lOb-5 should stop short 
of reaching any transaction that manipulates the price of, or market for, any se-
curity. 
86. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
87. The Court in Hochfelder expressly left open the question whether a plaintiff 
must prove scienter in order to obtain equitable relief under rule lOb-5. 425 U.S. 
at 193 n.12. Lower federal courts following Hochfelder have reached conflicting 
results. Compare SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), 
and Vacca v. Intra Management Corp., 415 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (proof 
of scienter required), with SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st 
Cir. 1976) (proof of scienter not required). 
88. Both the scienter element of rule lOb-5, see notes 86-87 supra and accom-
panying text, and the "purpose" element of section 9(a)(2), see text at notes 73-
78 supra, require a plaintiff to make a showing of manipulative intent. 
89. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, discussed in notes 86-87 supra and 
accompanying text; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) 
(limiting standing under rule lOb-5 to purchasers and sellers), discussed in Note, 
Standing Under Rule lOb-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 75 MICH. L. REV. 413 (1976). 
90. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-6 (1977). 
91. Two major issues determine the applicability of rule lOb-6: (1) the identity 
of persons prohibited from certain activities by the rule, and (2) the nature of a 
"distribution" of securities. The prohibitions of rule lOb-6 apply to three classes of 
persons-issuers, underwriters, and prospective underwriters. Section (c) of rule 
lOb-6 defines "underwriter" and "prospective underwriter'': 
( 1) The term "underwriter'' means a person who has agreed with an issuer or 
other person on whose behalf a distribution is to be made (i) to purchase se-
curities for distribution or (ii) to distribute securities for or on behalf of such 
issuer or other person or (iii) to manage or supervise a distribution of securities 
for or on behalf of such issuer or other person. 
(2) The term "prospective underwriter" means a person (i) who has agreed 
to submit or has submitted a bid to become an underwriter of securities as to 
which the issuer, or other person on whose behalf the distn1mtion is to be made, 
has issued a public invitation for bids, or (ii) who has reached an understand-
ing, with the issuer or other person on whose behalf a distribution is to be 
made, that he will become an underwriter, whether or not the terms and condi-
tions of the underwriting have been agreed upon. 
Rule lOb-6, it should be noted, defines "underwriter'' without the "control" element 
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the fear that trading by persons involved in a distribution might pre-
cipitate artificially high price levels92 and unjustified impressions of 
the level of market activity93 in the offered securities, the rule repre-
sents an attempt both to clarify the vagueness of section 9(a)(2) 
and to implement section lO(b) by providing a precise description 
of one type of prohibited activity.94 One court stated the purpose 
found in the definition of "underwriter" in the Securities Act of 1933, § 2(11), 
15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll) (1970). For discussions of the persons to whom rule lOb-6 
applies, see authorities cited in note 9 supra. 
Rule lOb-6 contains no definition of the term "distribution." Commentary on 
rule lOb-6, however, indicates that the meaning is different from the meaning of 
the term in § 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll) (1970), 
in that the presence of control is irrelevant under the rule. 3 L. Loss, supra note 
9, at 1596-97. For purposes of rule lOb-6, "[i]t is enough if the broker or dealer 
is engaged in a distribution in the sense of a major selling effort in his own behalf." 
Id. at 1597 (quoting SEC Securities Act Release No. 4075 (1959)); see Whitney, 
Rule IOb-6: The Special Study's. Rediscovered Rule, -62 MICH. L. REV. 567, 567 n.3 
(1964): 
It is not necessary (nor even necessarily easy) to reconcile completely the sub-
stantive content of the term ["distribution''], as so used, with that of the same 
term as used in the context of the Secnrities Act of 1933. . . . In Rule lOb-
-6, the term "distribution" is employed to fix the setting in which, for the pro-
tection of investors, restrictions must be imposed upon the actors in that setting, 
in order to prevent distortion of the market price and trading activity of the 
securities involved. In the 1933 Act . • • , on the other hand, the term is used 
to facilitate a determination of whether circumstances exist such as to require 
the registration of securities in order to provide fair and adequate disclosure 
of factual and financial information on which an intelligent investment decision 
may be based. 
The SEC has made the same point concerning the meaning of the term "distribution" 
in the context of rule lOb-6. See In re Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 
660 (1961). See also E. Wruss, supra note 9, at 125-29; Foshay, supra note 11, 
at 920-21; Rogoff, Legal Regulation of Over-the-Counter Market Manipulation: 
Critique and Proposal, 28 ME. L. REV. 149, 177-82 (1976); Comment, supra note 
9, at 819-29. 
In the absence of control as a relevant factor, six indicia of a "distribution" for 
the purposes of rule lOb-6 can be identified: ( 1) · the absolute and relative size of 
the offering; (2) the number of proposed offerees; (3) required distributive effort; 
(4) presence of a selling group; (5) payment of a special commission to salesmen; 
and (6) the degree of a particular broker-dealer's concentration on "pushing" the one 
security. 3 L Loss, supra note 9, at 1597; 6 id. at 3766-69 (Supp. 1969). 
92. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 577 (2d 
Cir. 1970), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 
S. Ct. 926 (1977); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 
SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); 3 L. Loss, 
supra note 9-, at 1596; Lowenfels, supra note 47, at 1398. 
93. See Jacobs, Regulation of Manipulation by SEC Rule I0b-5, 18 N.Y.L.F. 
511, 534 (1973); cf. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK Ex-
CHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1934) (Section lO(b) 
is designed to forbid "every . . . device used to persuade the public that activity 
in a security is the reflection of a genuine demand instead of a mirage."). 
94. See Foshay, supra note 11, at 946; Wolfson, supra note 62, at 810. 
At the time it was adopted, rule lOb-6 was not an innovation; it was the result 
of a series of judicial interpretations of the applicability of §§ 9(a)(2) and lO(b) 
to trading by participants in securities distributions. See, e.g., In re Adams & Co., 
33 S.E.C. 444 (19-52); In re Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106 (1949); In re 
Thornton & Co., 28 S.E.C. 208, qffd., 171 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1948); In re Kidder 
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of rule 1 0b-6 quite succinctly when it observed that 
Manipulation was often accomplished by those about to sell securi-
ties or already engaged in selling securities bidding on the market 
for the same securities, thereby creating an unjustifiable impression 
of market activity which would facilitate the sale at artificially high 
prices. This was one of the practices which the Securities Exchange 
Act was designed to eradicate, and it is this practice which is covered 
by Rule X-lOb-6.95 
In essence, rule 10b-6(a) 96 forbids any participant in a dis-
tribution from directly or indirectly bidding for, purchasing, or 
attempting to induce any person to purchase the security that is 
the subject of the distribution or is of the same class or series of 
the security. The rule also contains eleven exceptions, four of which 
are relevant to the problem of manipulative options trading. 97 Sig-
nificantly, there is no language in the rule explicitly stating that par-
ticipants in a distribution are prohibited from trading puts and calls. 98 
Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559 (1945); In re Russell Maguire & Co., 10 S.E.C. 332 
(1941). See also Comment, supra note 9. 
95. SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (foot-
note omitted). 
96. The substantive prohibition of rule lOb-6 appears in subsection (a). Other 
subsections provide definitions and exceptions. Hence, all references to "rule lOb-6" 
are to rule 10b-6(a) unless otherwise indicated. 
97. Rule lOb-6 provides: 
(a) It shall constitute a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" as 
used in section lO(b) of the Act for any person, 
( 1) Who is an underwriter or prospective underwriter in a particular distribu-
tion of securities, or 
(2) Who is the issuer or other person on whose behalf such a distribution is 
made, or 
(3) Who is a broker, dealer, or other person who has agreed to participate 
or is participating in such a distribution, directly or indirectly . . . to bid for 
or purchase for any account in which he has a beneficial interest, any security 
which is the subject of such distribution, or any security of the same class and 
series, or any right to purchase any such security, or to attempt to induce any 
person to purchase any such security or right, until after he has completed his 
participation in such distribution: Provided, however, that this section shall not 
prohibit ... 
(vi) offers to sell or the solicitation of offers to buy the securities being dis-
tributed (including securities or rights acquired in stabilizing) or securities or 
rights offered as principal by the person making such offer to sell or solicita- ' 
tion;or 
(vii) the exercise of any right or conversion privilege to acquire any security; 
or 
(viii) stabilizing transactions not in violation of [rule lOb-7, 17 C.F.R.] § 240. 
l0b-7 [(1977)]; or 
(ix) bids for or purchases of rights not in violation of [rule l0b-8, 17 C.F.R.] 
§ 240.lOb-8 [(1977)]. 
98. In announcing the adoption of rule lOb-6, the SEC declared that "[t]he fact 
that a particular activity is not specifically dealt with or prohibited in such rules 
does not necessarily mean that it is not unlawful under the Act or the Commission's 
other rules." SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5194, July 5, 1955, [1952-1957 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,r 76,350. Thus, even if it be concluded 
that rule lOb-6 is inapplicable to options trading, § 9(a) (2) and rule lOb-5 provide 
independent bases for regulating manipulative options trading by participants in a 
distribution. See text at notes 60-90 supra. However, because these provisions are 
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However, close analysis of the language of the rule reveals that 
it can be construed to apply to manipulative options transactions. 
There exist two alternative routes that lead to the conclusion that 
rule 1 0b-6 prohibits manipulative options tracling by the participants 
in a distribution. The first of these approaches focuses on the en-
tirety of the rule's prohibitory language: 
It shall constitute a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" 
as used in section lO(b) of the Act for any [participant in a 
distribution] . . . to bid for or purchase . . . any security which 
is the subject of such distribution, or any security of the same 
class and series, or any right to purchase any such security.00 
At first glance, this rule may not appear to reach manipulative 
options tracling. Yet, although the terms "put," "call," or "option" 
are not used in the rule, the plain meaning of the "right to purchase" 
suggests that the phrase refers to call options. Under this analysis, 
acquiring a call on the security being distributed would be a violation 
of rule 1 0b-6. A possible weakness of this interpretation is that it 
appears to leave the rule without provision for regulating the trading 
of puts, which are "rights to sell"; indeed, if the rule does not cover 
puts, it may not be intended to cover options at all. 
A second interpretative problem with rule 1 0b-6 is also relevant 
here: it is by no means certain that the term "right" as used in rule 
lOb-6 is not a term of art possessing some technical meaning-
specifically, it is possible that the drafters of the rule did not intend 
"right" to denote "option." For example, section 9(b)100 grants the 
SEC the authority to promulgate rules and regulations concerning 
puts, calls, straddles, and other options or privileges. Section 
9(d) then states ,that for purposes of section 9 "the terms 'put,' 
'call,' 'straddle,' 'option,' or 'privilege' ... shall not include any 
registered warrant, right, or convertible security."101 Thus, for pur-
poses of section 9, Congress intended that rights and options be con-
sidered as mutually exclusive instruments. It may be, therefore, that 
the term "right" as used in rule 1 0b-6 was meant to refer to prefer-
ences created by the issuer of the underlying stock and not to 
"options," which, of course, may be generated by persons other than 
the issuer.102 This contention is supported by the fact that rule 
1 0b-6 was proposed and adopted in a "package" -that included rules 
lOb-7103 and lOb-8.104 Rule l0b-8 regulates "distributions through 
written in broad terms, it is desirable from a regulatory standpoint to find the spe-
cific language of rule lOb-6 applicable to manipulative options trading. 
99. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a) (1977) (emphasis added). 
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1970); see text at notes 55-56 supra. 
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(d) (1970) (emphasis added). 
102. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 467. 
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-7 (1977). Rule lOb-7 deals with stabilizing activity 
by participants in a distribution. For a discussion of the Congressional attitude to-
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rights," using the term "rights" in the context of "rights issued on 
a pro-rata basis to securities holders." Also, the ninth exception to 
rule 10b-6(a) refers to "bids for or purchases of rights not in viola-
tion of Rule lOb-8."105 These usages imply that the term "rights" 
in rule lOb-6 should be accorded its rule 1 0b-8 meaning. In short, 
the context of these rules suggests that, for purposes of the Ex-
change Act, "rights" are distinguishable from "puts and calls," and 
that the omission of any reference to options in rule lOb-6 renders 
that rule inapplicable to such instruments. 
Both the argument that rule 1 0b-6 applies to calls but not puts 
and the position that "rights'' as used in that rule is a term of art 
that does not denote "option" lack substantial force in light of a 1971 
SEC "no-action" letter.106 This letter provi~es a sound basis for ar-
guing that the absence of a specific reference to "puts" in rule 
lOb-6 is explained by the existence of other language in the rule 
that prohibits their manipulative use. As mentioned earlier, rule 
lOb-6 prohibits bids for the security being distributed.107 In cor-
respondence concerning Progressive Phone Systems, Inc., the SEC 
staff took the position that the phrase "bid for" includes the issuance 
of put options. Responding to an inquiry by the issuer and under-
writer of a new issue of comµion stock who wanted to offer put 
options during the distribution in connection with the shares of stock, 
the SEC staff concluded that the scheme was "inherently fraudulent" 
and that "[t]he offering of 'put options' by the issuer and the under-
writer on the very securities being distributed would constitute a 
continuing bid by [the issuer] and the underwriter for the common 
stock and would preclude the granting of any exemption" under rule 
1 0b-6(f),108 which allows the SEC to waive the rule in its entirety 
upon a proper showing.100 The SEC's broad construction of the term 
"bid" seems reasonable, 110 since reading the term liberally serves the 
ward stabilization at the time the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was passed, see 
note 62 supra. 
104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-8 (1977). 
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(ix) (1977). 
106. Progressive Phone Sys., Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) ,r 78,361 (June 30, 1971). 
101. See text at note 99 supra. 
108. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,r 78,361 (June 30, 
1971) (emphasis added). 
109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(f) (1977): 
This section shall not prohibit any transaction or transactions if the Commis-
sion, upon written request or upon its own motion, exempts such transaction 
or transactions, either unconditionally or on specified terms and conditions, as 
not constituting a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance comprehended 
within the purpose of this section. 
110. The Progressive Phone ruling that the writing of a put option constitutes 
a bid for the underlying security is reasonable because the writer of a put option 
in effect promises to buy the underlying security at a specified price from the op-
tionee, regardless of the market price of that security during the life of the option. 
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purposes of rule 1 0b-6 and is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
position that the judiciary should take a flexible view of section 
l0(b) when deciding what activities are within its scope.111 
If rule 1 0b-6 prohibits writing puts because this kind of trans-
action constitutes a "bid for" the underlying security, the argument 
that the phrase "right to purchase" as used in the rule should be read 
to include calls is strengthened considerably. As mentioned ear-
lier, 112 one basis for the position that rule 1 0b-6 does not apply to 
options -is the assertion that "right to purchase" does not include puts 
and thus the rule may not apply to options at all. This objection 
is eliminated by the Progressive Phone interpretation of rule 
l0b-6. It would be incongruous to conclude that rule l0b-6 applies 
to trading puts but not to trading calls-either kind of transaction 
can be used to manipulate the price of the underlying security. 
Writing a put has substantially the same effect as acquiring a call-
in either case the party with whom the participant deals can be ex-
pected to purchase the underlying security, thereby causing the price 
of the security to rise.113 It is . thus appropriate to prohibit partici-
pants from engaging in either of these actions, and, to recapitulate, 
if writing a put is a "bid for" the underlying security and if acquiring 
a call is acquiring a "right to purchase" that security, then rule 1 0b-6 
is sufficiently broad to proscribe both activities. 
Independent of the above analysis of the prohibitory language 
of the rule is a second route to the conclusion that rule 1 0b-6 prohib-
its manipulative options trading by the participants in a distribution. 
This approach focuses on the term "purchase." The rule makes it 
unlawful for a participant "to bid for or purchase" the security being 
distributed.114 Section 3(a)(13)115 of the Exchange Act states that 
the term "purchase" includes "any contract to buy, purchase, or oth-
erwise acquire." Applying this definition to the rule suggests that 
certain options transactions may be viewed as "contracts to acquire" 
and thus are purchases of the underlying securities. Basic contract 
law defines an option as a unilateral contract between the optionor 
and the optionee. 116 If this definition is applied to put and call op-
111. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 
(1971). 
112. See text at note 99 supra. 
113. If the participant acquires calls, the other party can be expected to enter 
the market and make purchases of the underlying securities to cover his obligation. 
See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text. Similarly, by writing puts with strik-
ing prices at or above the market price, the participant can induce the other party 
to purchase the underlying securities at a price that will make it profitable to exer-
cise the puts. 
114. See note 97 supra. 
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970). 
116. See 1 S. WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS § 61A (3d ed. 1957). 
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tions, 117 it is clear that an individual who acquires calls or writes puts 
becomes a party to a "contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise ac-
quire" the underlying security. According to section 3(a)(13), this 
amounts to a purchase, and thus rule 1 0b-6 is applicable to the trans-
action. 
While the conclusion that puts and calls are "purchases" under 
rule 1 0b-6 may seem clear without further discussion, it is strength-
ened by an analysis of the policies of rule 1 0b-6. During early judi-
cial efforts to interpret the Exchange Act, courts agonized over the 
question whether, for purposes of the "purchase and sale" require-
ment of section 16(b),118 a "purchase" of the underlying security 
occurs in a transaction involving rights, warrants, options, or 
other conversion privileges when a person acquires such a privilege, 
or whether the "purchase" occurs when the conversion privilege is 
exercised and the underlying security is obtained. The courts decid-
ing this question generally have concluded that no purchase occurs 
until the conversion privileges are exercised,119 but this view did not 
develop into a strict rule. The courts ultimately devised a test that ex-
plored a particular transaction's potential for abuse; if the transaction 
served in any way to accomplish results that the statute was designed 
to prevent, the courts deemed it a "purchase and sale" and held it 
violative of the Act.120 
117. Several commentators have concluded that puts and calls are "contracts." 
See, e.g., Michaely & Lee, Put and Call Options: Criteria for Applicability of Sec-
tion 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 239, 242-46 
(1965); Note, Put and Call Options Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 69 YALE L.J. 868, 883-85 (1960). 
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970): 
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have 
been obtained by [a] beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his 
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and 
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . . within 
any period of less than six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by 
the issuer •... 
119. See Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1962); Blau v. Ogsbury, 
210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
337 U.S. 907 (1949); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Shulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); 
cf. Truncate v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), modified, 8~ F. Supp. 
628 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), ("purchase" includes receipt of warrants by a corporate officer 
pursuant to an employment contract). 
120. See, e.g., Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 n.4 
(1972); Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1960), aftd., 368 U.S. 403 
(1962); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958) (citing Comment, 
The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 59 
YALE L.J. 510, 513 (1950) ). Earlier cases might have been applying the same stand-
ard, finding no purchase until the rights were exercised, simply because they were 
attempting to fix the purchase at a point within six months of the sale in order 
to establish liability under section 16(b). See, e.g., Champion Home Builders Co. 
v. Jeffress, 490 F.2d 611, 616-17 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974); 
Booth v. Varian Assoc., 334 F.2d 1, 3-5 (1st Cir. 1964); Blau v. Mission Corp., 
212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Hardee, Stock Options 
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Although the question whether a purchase or sale occurs when 
an option is acquired, written, or exercised now appears to be moot 
for purposes of section 16(b),121 it is submitted that the early inter-
pretation of the term "purchase"-that a purchase occurs only when 
the option is exercised-should not be implanted into rule lOb-6, 
for to do so would nullify the purpose of the rule. As discussed 
above, 122 rule 1 0b-6 is intended to prevent the manipulation of the 
price of, and the creation of apparent trading activity in, the security 
being distributed. It is clear that options transactions can create the 
adverse effects sought to be prevented by the rule, 123 and therefore, 
unless the term "purchase" is interpreted to include writing puts and 
acquiring calls, the purpose of the rule could be frustrated.124 
Indeed, no persuasive reason exists to apply ipso facto to section 
and the "Insider Trading" Provision of the Securities Exchange Act, 65 HARV. L. 
REv. 997, 1004-09 (1952). 
121. Rule 3all-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3all-1 (1977), as amended by SEC Exchange 
Act Release No. 9929 (Jan. 29, 1973) [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC, L. 
REP. (CCH) ,r 79,196, interprets the § 3(a)(ll), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1970), 
definition of "equity security" to include "any stock or similar security . . . or any 
put, call, straddle, or other option or privilege of buying such a security from or 
selling such a security to another without being bound to do so." See Freedman 
v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp. 1129, 1151 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Thus, for purposes of 
§ 16(b), which uses the term "equity security," see note 118 supra, acquiring a con-
version privilege clearly constitutes a "purchase" of the underlying security. 
In Vogel-Lorber, Inc. v. Options on Shares, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,r 94,911 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court held that rule 3al1-1 
should be extended to clarify the § 3(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970), defi-
nition of a "security" as that term is used in § lO(b) and rule l0b-5. In light 
of this ruling, it should be noted here that it would be inappropriate for a court 
similarly to hold that rule 3al1-1 also clarifies the definition of "security" for pur-
poses of rule l0b-6. Since rule lOb-6 allows participants to make "offers to sell" 
the securities being distributed, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(3 )(vi) (1977), considering 
puts and calls as different forms of their underlying securities would frustrate the 
policy of the rule. Specifically, rule lOb-6 prohibits "bids for'' the security being 
distributed, and the issuance of put options has been interpreted as a "bid for" the 
underlying securities. See text at notes 108-09 supra. However, use of the rule 
3all-1 interpretation of "equity security" in the context of rule l0b-6 would allow 
participants to "offer to sell" put options respecting the security being distributed, 
by virtue of the sixth exception to rule 10b-6(a), discussed in text at notes 137-40 
infra. Therefore, the rule 3all-1 interpretation of "equity security" should not be 
extended by analogy to the term "security" as used in rule lOb-6. 
The above conclusion does not mean that the court in Vogel-Lorber wrongly 
relied on the rule 3all-1 interpretation of "equity security" when dealing with a 
§ lO(b) and rule lOb-5 problem. The preamble to the general definitions of § 3(a) 
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1970), states that the definitions in that 
section shall apply ''unless the context otherwise requires." Thus, the different cir-
cumstances covered by rule lOb-5 and rule lOb-6 can justifiably call for different 
definitions of the term "security." 
122. See text at notes 92-95 supra. 
123. See notes 48-49 & 113 supra; text at notes 46-50 supra. 
124. It should be remembered that the "purchase" theory is advanced as an al-
ternative to the theories that acquiring calls is proscribed by the prohibition against 
purchasing "rights to purchase" and writing puts is encompassed within the language 
prohibiting "bids for" the underlying security. See text at notes 99-113 supra, 
June 1977] Rule J0b-6 1509 
10 the interpretation of "purchase" as used in section 16(b). Refer-
ence is again made to section 3(a) of the Act,125 which provides that 
the general definitions contained in that section shall apply "unless 
the context otherwise requires." It is therefore clear that Congress 
intended the statutory definitions to be applied flexibly, and that, re-
gardless of what "purchase" might mean in section 16 or elsewhere 
in the Act, the term should be construed in a manner that will pro-
mote the purposes of the various sections in which it appears. The 
Supreme Court accepted this analysis in SEC v. National Securities, 
lnc.:126 
Although the interdependence of the various sections of the securi-
ties laws is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of 
the language Congress has chosen, ordinary rules of statutory con-
struction still apply. The meaning of particular phrases must be 
determined in context . . . . We must therefore address ourselves 
to the meaning of the words "purchase or sale" in the context of 
§ l0(b). Whatever these or similar words may mean in the numerous 
other contexts in which they appear in the securities laws, only 
this one narrow question is presented here. 
Therefore, based on the policy of rule lOb-6 and the flexibility in-
herent in the definition of the term "purchase," it is reasonable to 
define that term for purposes of rule 1 0b-6 to include acquiring calls 
and writing puts. 
The two alternative routes to the conclusion that rule 1 0b-6 pro-
hibits manipulative options trading-the approach focusing on the 
rule~s prohibitory language generally and the approach interpreting the 
term "purchase"-both lead to the result that the rule proscribes par-
ticipants in a distribution from writing puts and acquiring calls during 
the distribution. The rule lists eleven types of activities that are ex-
empt from the rule, 127 however, and two of these exceptions contain 
language that, if improperly construed, might vitiate the ability of the 
rule to control manipulative put writing and call acquisition. 
The ninth exception to rule 1 0b-6 allows "bids for or purchases 
of rights not in violation of [rule lOb-8]."128 Arguably,. this lan-
guage is sufficiently broad to allow the acquisition of calls and per-
haps even puts. If the term "rights" is construed to include both kinds 
12S. 1S U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1970). 
126. 393 U.S. 4S3, 466 (1969). See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & 
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); fatemational Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 
1334, 1343 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) ("[W]e should note 
that having elevated the functional interpretation of the terms 'purchase' and 'sale' 
to the sine qua non of § 16(b) analysis, ..• we surely would be remiss were we 
to discard this functional approach in the milieu of § lO(b). Accordingly, ... 
we do not consider the interpretation of the terms 'purchase' and 'sale' as used in 
§ 16(b) to be dispositive of their meaning in the context of§ lO(b)"). 
127. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(i)-(xi) (1977). 
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a) (ix) (1977) (emphasis added), quoted in note 97 
supra, 
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of options, 120 it could be argued that the acquisition of such "rights" 
technically is not a violation of lOb-8130 because that rule is con-
cerned only with distributions of securities to existing shareholders 
on a pro rata basis through issuer-created rights. It would follow 
that acquiring puts and calls would be "bids for or purchases of rights 
not in violation of [rule 1 0b-8]" and thus would be permissible 
under this exception to rule 1 0b-6. As discussed earlier, 131 the 
term "right to purchase" as used in rule lOb-6 must be construed 
broadly enough to include call options, but a broad interpretation 
of the term "rights" as used in the ninth exception to the rule that 
would allow participants in a distribution to acquire calls ("rights") 
is unwarranted. It seems clear that the exception was intended to 
allow only the kind of activity regulated by rule lOb-8. More-
over, such a broad interpretation would contradict the general pro-
hibition against bidding for or purchasing "any right to purchase" 
in rule 1 0b-6 by allowing purchases of calls and thus would defeat 
the rule's antimanipulation purpose. Thus, the ninth exception, if 
properly interpreted, poses no barrier to applying rule 1 0b-6 to manip-
ulative options acquisitions. 
The eighth exception to rule 1 0b-6, which allows "stabilizing 
transactions not in violation of [rule 1 0b-7],"132 could also be mis-
construed so as to impair the impact of the rule. Rule 1 0b-7 allows 
participants in a distribution to trade the security being distributed 
in order to stabilize its price. Although a comprehensive discussion 
of stabilizing is beyond the purview of this Note, 183 it sho.uld be ob-
served that this exception allows any kind of options transaction-
not only writing puts and acquiring calls but also acquiring and exer-
cising puts and writing and exercising calls-so long as the activity 
does not go beyond "stabilizing." In the context of a distribution, 
it would behoove the participants who desire to "stabilize" to pur-
chase the security itself rather than options on the security, since ac-
quiring the security would more efficiently affect its price. Never-
theless, it is not inconceivable that participants might trade options-
in particular, acquire calls134-in order to stabilize the security's 
price. Arguably, such activity is contemplated by the sixth exception 
to rule 1 0b-6, 135 which in part allows the sale of "rights acquired in 
129. Note that this exception speaks only of "rights," not "rights to purchase," 
which is used in the prohibitory clause of rule 10b-6(a). It is arguable, therefore, 
that the former term includes puts as well as calls. 
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-8 (1977). 
131. -See text at notes 99-113 supra. 
132. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(viii) (1977), quoted in note 97 supra. 
133. Recognizing stabilization as a legitimate device in 1934, Congress did not 
prohibit such activity but left it to be regulated by the SEC. See note 62 supra. 
134. See notes 48-49 & 113 supra; text at notes 48-50 supra. 
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(vi) (1977), quoted in note 97 supra. 
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stabilizing." If calls are acquired for purposes of stabilization, other 
exceptions to rule lOb-6 allow their exercise or sale.136 However, 
if options are traded for a manipulative purpose (i.e., to do more 
than stabilize the price of the security), the transaction is not pro-
tected by rule 1 Ob-7 and is subject to the antimanipulation provision 
of rule lOb-6. Thus, the eighth exception to rule lOb-6 does not 
render the rule ineffective in prohibiting manipulative options trad-
ing. 
Neither the ninth nor the eighth exception to rule 1 Ob-6 impairs 
the power of the rule to prohibit participants in a distribution from 
writing puts or acquiring calls to manipulate the price of the security 
being distributed. According to the analysis thus far, however, rule 
1 Ob-6 does not appear to extend to writing calls, acquiring puts, or 
exercising either. Two of the eleven enumerated exceptions to rule 
1 Ob-6, the sixth and seventh, contain language that permits these types 
of transactions during the distribution. It is submitted that exempting 
these transactions from the rule is sensible because these activities, as 
explained in the following discussion, tend to benefit the distribution 
without manipulating the security's price. · 
First, the sixth exception to rule 1 Ob-6 permits "offers to sell or 
the solicitation of offers to buy the securities being distributed (in-
cluding securities or rights acquired in stabilizing) or securities or 
rights offered as principal by the person making such offer to sell 
or solicitation."137 The purpose of this exemption is to assure under-
writers, brokers, and dealers that they may make a concerted effort 
to sell the securities being offered without violating the rule. Cer-
tain options transactions that are not inherently manipulative can eas-
ily be viewed as "offers to sell" or "solicitation[s] of offers to buy." 
The effect of characterizing certain options transactions in such a 
manner is to insulate them from the prohibitions of the rule. 
As discussed above,138 the SEC staff iri the Progressive Phone 
no-action letter took the position that writing puts constituted a "con-
tinuing bid" for the underlying securities. It follows from this rea-
soning that writing calls constitutes a continuing "offer to sell" the 
underlying security and is therefore permitted by the sixth exception 
to rule lOb-6. Moreover, it follows that bids for or purchases of puts 
constitute "solicitations of offers to buy'' the securities being dis-
tributed: since the writer of a put is in effect making an offer to 
buy,139 an individual who makes a bid for or purchases a put is in 
effect "soliciting" an offer to buy. Thus, the sixth exception to rule 
136. The sixth exception, see text at note 137 infra, allows the sale of calls; 
the seventh exception, see text at notes 142-43 infra, allows their exercise. 
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(3 )(vi) (1977). 
138. See text at notes 106-11 supra. 
139. See note 110 supra, 
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lOb-6 can be read to allow the writing of calls as "offers to sell," and 
the acquisition of puts as "solicitations of offers to buy," the security 
being distributed. 
In this context it is appropriate to consider the act of exercising 
a put. Since courts have determined that exercising a call constitutes 
a purchase, 140 it follows that exercising a put amounts to a sale of 
the underlying security, and such a transaction is outside the scope 
of rule lOb-6 altogether. This is consistent with the conclusion 
above concerning the acquisition of puts, which are exempted from 
the rule by the sixth exception. 
In short, the conclusions reached with respect to writing calls, 
purchasing puts, and exercising puts are consistent with the purpose 
of rule 1 0b-6. All of these transactions are ultimately sales of the 
underlying security; because rule lOb-6 is intended to prohibit only 
purchases or bids for the security being distributed, 141 none of these 
transactions should be prohibited. 
Second, the seventh exception to rule 10b-6(a) allows "the exer-
cise of any right or conversion privilege to acquire any security."142 
Although there are no cases or rulings on point, this exception seems 
to indicate that participants in a distribution may exercise call options 
on a security being distributed without such activity- constituting a 
"manipulative or deceptive device." Before this exception was 
added to the rule, courts had deemed the term "purchase" to include 
the exercise of call options.143 It might appear, therefore, that the 
seventh exception, in allowing purchases through the exercise of 
calls, directly contradicts rule 1 0b-6's general prohibition of all pur-
chases. When this exception is viewed in the context of the entire 
rule, however, its scope becomes quite limited. Because, as already 
determined, 144 the rule prohibits the acquisition of calls during the 
distribution period except for stabilization purposes, the only calls 
that may be exercised during this period are those acquired before 
an individual becomes a participant145 and those acquired during the 
distribution for stabilization purposes. Allowing the exercise of such 
calls is certainly reasonable. The exception eliminates the hardship 
imposed upon a participant who acquires calls prior to -the distribu-
tion or in legitimate stabilizing transactions: but for the exception, 
the participant would be forced to hold his options and perhaps 
watch them expire. If calls are exercised in order to manipulate the 
security's price, such an abuse would be within the scope of section 
140. See text at notes 119-20 supra. 
141. See text at notes 91-96 supra. 
142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(vii) (1977), quoted in note 97 supra. 
143. See text at notes 118-20 supra. 
144. See text at notes 98-126 supra. 
145. See notes 9 and 91 supra. 
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9(a) (2) or rule l0b-5.146 Thus, the seventh exception permits 
some calls to be exercised without creating a "loophole" in the rule's 
antimanipulation scheme. 
III. SUMMARY 
Although the drafters of rule 1 0b-6 may not have contemplated 
the current widespread interest in options trading when they promul-
gated the rule in 1955, it is clear that options provide the participants 
in a distribution with the opportunity to manipulate the price of the 
security being distributed. Fortunately, it is possible to construe the 
language of the rule as prohibiting manipulative options transactions 
while permitting other harmless transactions to occur. However, this 
requires careful interpretation of the subtle language of the rule. 
Accordingly, the SEC should consider clarifying its position with re-
spect to options trading by persons participating in a distribution. 
Rule lOb-6 should be construed to apply to options transactions 
of the participants in a distribution as follows: 
1. Acquiring calls-Because a call is a "right to purchase," the 
participants in a distribution may not acquire calls on the security 
being distributed during the period of their participation, except 
for stabilization purposes. 
2. Exercising calls-Exercising a call is a purchase of the under-
lying security, but such purchases are specifically exempted from 
the prohibition of rule 1 0b-6 by the rule's seventh exception. 
Because participants cannot acquire calls during the distribution 
except for stabilization purposes, however, the only calls that can 
be exercised are those acquired by a participant before he attains 
that status and those that are acquired for stabilization purposes. 
3. Writing calls-Because writing a call is an offer to sell the 
underlying security, rule l0b-6 does not prohibit such transac-
tions. 
4. Acquiring puts-Acquiring a put, like writing a call, is essen-
tially a sale of the underlying security. Thus, such transactions 
are not proscribed by rule 1 0b-6. 
5. Exercising puts--Because exercising a put is clearly a sale, 
such transactions are not within the scope of rule l0b-6. 
6. Writing puts-Writing a put amounts to bidding for the un-
derlying security, and therefore such transactions are prohibited 
by rule 1 0b-6. 
146. See text at notes 59-90 supra. Rule lOb-6 is not the exclusive provision 
for the regulation of manipulations. See note 98 supra. 
